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Advanced Persistent Threats (APT s), are by far the biggest threat an organization 
could deal with since it is continuous and persistent until it achieves its goal. An example 
of that could be espionage from a different organization (Ponemon Institute LLC, 2014).  
Community Sources, are members with trusted relationship with the energy 
company. Examples would be providers, suppliers or subsidiaries that has an economical 
mutual benefit from co-existing with the enterprise. For Example, Saudi Aramco, has 
close ties with Saudi Arabia Basic Industries Corporation (SABIC) another petrochemical 
company that could share information related to Cyber Threat Intelligence. Nonetheless, 
due to the nature of the company government security reports could also be available due 
to the national security implications of the company’s operational requirement. 
Deterrence, is the ability to retaliate and render the attacker means of attacking 
unavailable. 
External Sources, are broken into two categories one which is publicly available 
information, and other paid reports from Security Agencies. 
Hacktivists, are a group of individuals that are motivated by political agenda 
trying to influence decision making by inflecting damage or sabotaging the image of the 
targeted organization. 
ICS, Industrial Control System (ICS) are systems that provide the ability to 
control industrial systems from a centralized location or a single device. 
Insider Threats, is considered one of the top Attackers Category since its human 
in nature which is unpredictable. Employees who are disgruntled or others with ability to 
go over their clearance could prove to be a huge threat to any organization (Ponemon 
Institute LLC, 2014). 
Internal Sources, such as Incident reports or data logs gathered from devices such 





Nation State Actors, Another Attacker Category in the Threat Intelligence 
framework with organizations and global economy under political agenda it shows that 
sometimes nations gain from actions against organization being it a cyber war or 
retaliation of some sort (Ponemon Institute LLC, 2014).  
Prevention and protection, All actions and process in place that fortifies the 
organization and minimizes the damage that can be taken by adversaries and this goes 
along with the minimum required from any organization regardless of the adversary in 
place.  
Resilience, This strategy capitalizes on the fact the failure is inevitable and 
therefore minimizing the damage and effect after the fact should be minimal in assets and 
down time.  
SCADA System, is a Supervisory Control System & Data Acquisition. That 
manages the gathering of data collected from a set of devices and displays it in a user 
friendly manner appropriate to the industry it is implanted in. 
Script Kiddie, Another Attacker Category in the Threat Intelligence, who are 
usually individuals with no real agenda other than self-gratification from the ability to 
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The research investigates the problem raised by the rapid development in the technology 
industry giving security concerns in facilities built by the energy industry containing 
diverse platforms. The difficulty of continuous updates to network security architecture 
and assessment gave rise to the need to use threat intelligence frameworks to better asses 
and address networks security issues. Focusing on access control security to the ICS and 
SCADA systems that is being utilized to carry out mission critical and life threatening 
operations. The research evaluates different threat intelligence frameworks that can be 
implemented in the industry seeking the most suitable and applicable one that address the 
issue and provide more security measures. The validity of the result is limited to the same 
environment that was researched as well as the technologies being utilized. The research 
concludes that it is possible to utilize a Threat Intelligence framework to prioritize 






CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Statement of the Problem 
Due to the long lasting life cycle of energy industry facilities, control systems 
installed exceed their warranty or support period from different parties involved such as 
the operating system developer. Without the appropriate support, Industrial Control 
System (ICS) and Supervisory Control System & Data Acquisition SCADA systems 
become more prone to vulnerabilities and open to threats with no appropriate measures to 
overcome or contain the situation (Choo, 2011). Therefore, continuously finding 
appropriate measures and best practices that can be implemented across different 
platforms and segregated systems is a challenge and a security concern for companies 
and stakeholders in the energy section industry. A Threat Intelligence Framework in 
place would help streamline the process needed to fortify the facility and systems in 
place.  
1.2 Significance of the Problem 
 
The changing nature of the ICS systems developed for the energy industry has 
shifted from closed networks to open and connected ones (Igure, Laughter, & Williams, 
2006). Although this provides greater, faster and easier access to involved parties and 
beneficiaries of those systems, it also poses a huge security threat. Systems developed in 





had not been addressed. While the environment has changed from isolation to inclusion, 
the premise is still affecting the development cycle of the ICS and SCADA systems being 
used (Sommestad, Ekstedt, Holm, & Afzal, 2010). Moreover, the energy industry 
facilities in general are built and designed to last for several decades with minimum 
changes and continued maintenance. Therefore, hardware being used and systems 
installed eventually become obsolete, yet necessary for continues operation (Gold, 2009). 
Nonetheless, continuing to addressing those security concerns is important to companies 
working in the energy industry; hence, a threat intelligence framework is required. 
Furthermore, the huge shadow bestowed by the energy industry; and specifically, 
the oil industry above all industries, begs the question of how important it is to the world 
economics and countries exporting or importing energy resources. Therefore, securing 
the production in different operations in those industries will help countries maintain their 
economic status, income, or revenue.  
1.3 Scope of the Study 
 
This study was limited to facilities hosting the Industrial Control Systems (ICS) 
and Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition systems (SCADA). Furthermore, the study 
focuses on the energy section and primarily the oil industry within it. Moreover, the study 
involves Saudi Aramco Oil Company as an example that is used in this research. The 
company was selected due to the researcher’s knowledge about the company during its 
recent cyber-attack in 2013.  
Security challenges has been restricted to the lifecycle of the ICS and SCADA 





with current technologies associated with network security and threats. The research 
discusses several intelligence frameworks in order to find the suitable one that addresses 
continues reinforcement of network security. 
1.4 Purpose of the Study 
 
Today, ICS systems are rapidly evolving from proprietary to open standard 
protocols, from special purpose hardware and software to common Information 
Technology (IT) products, and from isolation to interconnection with corporate networks. 
Moreover, ICS systems were never designed with security in mind and many contain 
numerous security related vulnerabilities. On the other hand, technologies and devices 
used in the network industry out rapidly evolving providing a wider area of attack for any 
adversary. Therefore, continues revision and evaluation of network security procedures, 
practices, and devices is crucial to maintaining a safe and operational facility (Hieb, 
Chreiver, & Graham, 2013). 
This thesis discussed threat intelligence frameworks that can be applied to 
Industrial Control Systems (ICS) security challenges such as ICS cyber security 
requirements, interactions with outside networks to gain access to security patches, and 
antivirus. The thesis explored several frameworks that could support the continuity of 
securing facilities and operation across the corporate network of Saudi Aramco. 
1.5 Research Question 
 
Can a threat intelligence framework prioritize security access control upgrades for 






1.6 Assumptions, Limitations & Delimitations 
 
In this section the author is going to describe the assumptions and limitations and 
delimitations of the research question. 
1.6.1 Assumptions 
 
The current list is of assumptions for this master’s thesis: 
1- Information provided in the report is accurate and precise 
2-  Access control systems are appropriately maintained 
3- SCADA system operators are experts and knowledgeable 
4- No intentional error or malicious intention with employees working in 
security or handling ICS systems 
5-  Systems are updated appropriately  
6- Security records are properly maintained and documented 
7- Study assumes open budget and available funding for required security 
measures 
8- Reasonable adherence to well-known Security and best practices  
9- Compatibility measures are in place between different vendors and 
devices 
10- Control systems installed are properly tested and verified before 
deployment and startup of the facility 
11- Implementation of any framework is done in concurrence with any 
shutdown. 







The current list is the limitations for this master’s thesis: 
1- Sample and study was limited to the energy section industry 
2- Information related to access control security was used. 
3- Information is limited to public available resources only 
4- Comparison is done based on a single facility  
5- Financial expenses is limited to design and hardware required 
6- Facilities being compared is limited to single stage facilities and not 
multiple stages. 
7- Comparison values assigned to the framework is based on researcher 




The current list is of delimitations for this master’s thesis: 
1- Security controls that are not associated with access control as not 
included 
2- Reports that are not cleared by Saudi Aramco was not used 
3- Incomplete reports was not included in the study as source of information 









The research at hand is addressing the means of continuously securing access 
control systems deployed in the energy section industry in order to protect its multiple 
layer network and different platforms. Security measures have been known to be an issue 
in facilities in the industry due to the nature of the business being static over long periods 
of time while technological advances in the network architecture changes rapidly (Gold, 
2009). 
Having different operating systems and control systems as well as hardware 
installed in facilities built for decades stands create a challenge for security experts to 
maintain security in general. Nonetheless, access control security is one aspect that eludes 
more than any since human evolvement is a major aspect. Restricting access has been one 
of the prime security measures that is known to humanity. Yet, in this century it has 
transcended physical world and introduced digital and virtual environments as well.  
After examining and identifying the research merits, scope and significance the 
next chapter discusses current threat intelligence frameworks that can be utilized in the 
energy industry. Researcher provided an insight on literature available that is related to 






CHAPTER 2. REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 
The energy industry has always been crucial to world economics. Governments 
pay close attention and interest to the sector, and private companies are always catering 
and investing in supplying their demands and needs. The Industrial Control Systems 
(ICS) and Supervisory Control and Acquisition systems (SCADA) are both examples of 
systems that are used by energy companies and customized to their desire or to how 
much is being paid. Nevertheless, such systems have their own product life cycle (PLC) 
that affects the security and business continuity of companies working in the energy 
industry including oil and gas.  
The nature of the operation environment, being its economic importance to the 
stake holders or the safety of the employees running the equipment adds to the 
importance of security including access control measures (Leith & Piper, 2013). 
Moreover, ICS systems deal with life threatening variables such high pressure, power, 
temperature, and flow. Each of these, if not controlled and properly monitored, could lead 
to casualties and irreversible consequences to the involved assets or environment.  
2.1 Variables in ICS 
Facilities in the energy industry are built to last for several decades with minimum 





installation is meticulous to insure compatibility and minimum intervention (Ralstona, 
Grahamb, & Hiebb, 2007). In fact, ICS and SCADA systems and their operating systems 
(OS) are selected based on compatibilities and, in some cases, the system is designed to 
run on a specific version of an operating system exclusively. Consequently, that decision 
has a huge effect on the security aspect of the system and the level of support available 
including the access control measures used.  
ICS systems are very unique and there are many companies that develops it all 
around the world. For example, Emerson Process Management, Honeywell Process 
Solutions, Invensys, Siemens Energy & Automation, Yokogawa Electric(McMahon & 
Montague, 2005). Unlike the ICS systems that can be very unique and distinct even from 
the same company, operating systems running those programs are mostly one of three; 
Windows, UNIX and Linux. In addition, one major difference between them is in the 
proprietary and licensing. UNIX is one of the oldest Operating systems and was initially 
developed around 1970. The system was proprietary and licenses were needed to procure 
the OS. Linux was developed to be a look a-like system similar to UNIX but it was an 
open source system available to anyone. Several versions have been released since the 
early 1990s. However, some UNIX based systems are considered open source and could 
be acquired without licenses or purchasing. Windows was also developed after UNIX. 
However, due to its graphical user interface and ease of use it has become a dominant 
operating system in the industry despite the fact that it is proprietary and requires 
purchased licenses to operate.  
Furthermore, these differences are important and come into place when product 





them at any given time but Operating systems do not share that flexibility if offered. 
Linux is supported by groups and enthusiasts with no professional entity or authority 
backing the operating system because of their open source nature. UNIX based systems, 
are licensed and support in any customized system is mostly limited or very expensive. 
Windows, on the other hand, provides support for 10-15 years, including the extended 
support period. That time frame is considered very short for industries working in the 
energy section (Windows, 2014).  
With short or limited operating system support, running delicate and sensitive ICS 
systems that has long passed its own product life cycle support provided by its vendor 
presents a danger. The safety and security of those systems are jeopardized, including the 
access control measures implemented (Gold, 2009).  
2.1.1 Operating Systems 
Operating systems are software responsible to manage hardware and software 
resources available to be used by applications installed while interpreting inputs and 
reflecting outputs (Stallings, 2012). As mentioned earlier, the three major operating 
systems are UNIX, Linux, and Windows. Discussing those will provide a better 
understanding about long-term support of those platforms.  
UNIX, is multitasking, multiuser system utility developed by AT&T, however 
some companies had customized it and therefore licenses can be needed. In the case of 
custom designed systems support is limited and cannot be depended upon by industries in 
the energy section due to the high threat, demand and safety concerns associated with it. 
Nevertheless, ICS developers utilizing Unix-based software solution will provide the 






and software is a great asset since all the interactions and interfaces are known and 
available for troubleshooting code line by line (Ritchie & Thompson, 1978).  
Linux, is an open source system and is therefore similar to the UNIX system. ICS 
developers utilizing the Linux-based systems will take ownership and responsibility in 
troubleshooting any issue including ones related to the operating system (Linux, 2009).  
Windows, is a completely different and is more like a “black box” to ICS 
developers. The development is done based on an application programming interface 
(API) that is published by Microsoft. Thus, support provided by the ICS vendor is limited 
to the software itself and is closely related to OS functions, rather than the complete OS. 
Therefore, OS support is basically what is offered and regulated by Microsoft licenses 
(Strom, 2015). This two layer interaction can cause issues in pinpointing problems and 
therefore delay solutions of mitigations.  
In summary, an Oil Facility that has Industrial systems such as ICS and SCADA 
might be able to get support to those programs if something was to go wrong. However, 
that could not be said about the Operating Systems that are running it. As time goes by 
support to these OS becomes very limited and sometimes not available and thus affects 
the complete platform in which ICS and SCADA software is running on.  
2.1.2 Industrial Control Systems 
Due to security reasons ICS developers in the past have requested in some cases 
full isolation of their system from all other networks and devices not associated with their 
system to guarantee its operation and reliability. Systems developed and installed have 
been carefully installed as “islands” with no outside communication or correspondence. 






connected to the outside world or external variables give the illusion that it is protected 
because it is autonomic and enclosed. Consequently, security practices in developing 
their software was neglected or non-existent (Nicholson, Webber, Dyer, Patel, & Janicke, 
2012). However, due to isolation, those problems did not surface to the point where it 
became the center of attention in order to have it addressed.  
In reality, conversions of networks have been the norm in this decade. Systems 
are no longer isolated in “islands of networks”. Communication between different 
systems is becoming more and more essential for continuance and optimized operation 
(Ralstona, Grahamb, & Hiebb, 2007). While the network structure changed, the security 
practices in developing the ICS systems has yet to catch up or own up to the challenge. 
Developers have been adding security as an additive feature following the completion of 
the ICS software instead of employing it in every step of the process. This huge 
difference in attitude leads to vulnerabilities in the system, including access control 
issues.  
Furthermore, on average the development cycle of an ICS or SCADA system 
ranges from 3-5 years, based on the range and complexity of the system. Nonetheless, 
developers in some cases are willing to provide support to their software for up to 15 
years after discontinuation (Bradbury, 2012). Yet, that support is usually operational in 
nature and very rarely includes security or access control updates or fixes to their system.  
2.1.3 Access Control 
Access Control is measures, workflows and procedures put in place to limit, 
manage access to physical locations or logical systems. Access is either granted or not. If 






by giving access to everything or some things. Details and examples are shown in this 
section..  
Are security measures in place to limit the availability of information, systems or 
functionality to privileged or assigned personal, that includes hardware and software 
mechanisms ranging from key cards to passwords to monitor and audit establishing 
accountability and attribution? History has shown that gates and barriers are the means 
needed to limit access or protect physical assets. However, with the technology age and 
virtual world, user names and passwords have been the main way of implementing 
logical access control. In reality, critical facilities implement both for added security. 
Nonetheless, a single means of authentication is no longer valuable or rendered secure 
(Warfield, 2012). 
With advancements in technology, authentication using biological features has 
been utilized and implemented. For example, finger prints, eye scanners, voice 
recognition and facial recognition devices have been used as secondary access control 
measures. Moreover, tokens generating systematic numbers and other system generating 
massages with pass codes to systems are also being used as a secondary measure for 
identification (Vaidya, Makrakis, & Mouftah, 2013). 
Generally, a mix and match approach among the previous concepts is 
implemented in facilities based on level of security, budget and importance. Therefore, in 
industrial facilities physical gates and walls are in place and secure identification cards 
are being used to physically limit access to the facility. On the other hand, access to a 






or tokens. In some cases different locations within facilities require other layers of access 
control (Wiles, et al., 2007).  
Consequently, access control information needs to be managed, monitored and 
maintained to insure up to date information. Therefore, a centralized system or server is 
put in place to manage those credentials. Nevertheless, the task is difficult to maintain in 
a multi-layer network configuration or a mixed system environment in which different 
people have different access levels in different or multiple systems. For example, Several 
Employees might be given different levels of access to individual systems, Employee A 
is allowed Admin privilege on System B but only user privilege on system C, and 
Employee B is allowed Admin privilege on system C but only view access to system B.  
2.1.4 Threats 
Now days, technology threats in the Oil Industry have been mostly external. 
Therefore, protections and counter measures were tailored to secure the systems from 
outside access. However, since ICS systems and SCADA systems have been always in 
isolation that was not an issue and therefore external attacks were not considered 
threatening. Thus, the focus was on internal employees’ privileges and level of clearance. 
But with the expansion and development in the network structure of those devices and 
systems, external threats have been introduced to the equation once again. In fact, such 
threats are in some cases carried out by large entities including government agencies 
(Warfield, 2012). For example, the Stuxnet virus that was deployed to a specific 
Honeywell system in only a certain country and in limited numbers of nuclear facilities 






incident that hit Saudi Aramco, the biggest oil producing company in the world located in 
Saudi Arabia (Helman, 2012).  
Since threat levels have increased and the surface of attack has widened with the 
shear range of networks interconnected together, it stands to be reasoned that old security 
methods of managing access control to sensitive systems such as ICS and SCADA should 
be questioned (Willems & Software, 2011).  
On the other hand, connectivity between networks introduces corporate users that 
are interested in analyzing and observing the data outputted from their end node points in 
their facilities. Introducing different business needs onto the operational requirements for 
optimization and reporting purposes increases the internal threat level to SCADA and 
ICS systems exposed. Storey (2009) stated that understanding the process control 
network in which SCADA and ICS rides on is very important however, people and 
politics should not be neglected and thus should be considered if a truly secure solution is 
to be built. 
2.1.5 Current Studies 
Researchers have been studying the issue in detail, especially with the wide range 
of systems in place including legacy systems. A study suggesting using add-on measures 
to legacy systems utilizing microkernel-based architecture isolates network-interacting 
where bloom filters are in place to authenticate commands and access levels have been 
published recently (Hieb, Chreiver, & Graham, 2013). Such studies provide different 
meanings to accomplish access control measures, especially in an environment where 
systems could have been put in place more than a decade ago. Nevertheless, other 






zero-knowledge protocol in server aided verification (SAV), attribute certificates and 
multiple factor and level authentications (Vaidya, Makrakis, & Mouftah, 2013).  
Other studies showed the lack of effective security measures and total reliance on 
a single mechanism for access control, and that is usually demonstrated by the developers 
of the ICS and SCADA system (Cetinceviz & Bayindir, 2012). For Example, Systems 
that only used single user name and password without biometric authentication or the 
other way around. Nevertheless, some also discuss the threats and vulnerabilities added to 
those systems due to improper implementations stemming from lack of knowledge, 
complexity of the system, insufficient funds and missing required documentation 
(Sommestad, Ekstedt, Holm, & Afzal, 2010).  
“In 2010, Singapore’s Senior Minister of State for Law & Home Affairs 
explained that ‘with the ever-changing cyber landscape, we can expect to see adversaries 
evolve and come up with new threats to circumvent our security defenses. [And flagged 
that it] is therefore necessary for the IT security industry as a whole to step up to the plate 
to meet this challenge with innovative and strategic solutions against these emerging 
threats“ (Choo, 2011, p. 728). Moreover, focus and attention should be added into the 
development life cycle of ICS and SCADA systems.  
2.2 Typical Oil Field Infrastructure Design 
Now that the author have covered different aspects of the Control Systems used in 
an oil field facilities, it is important to draw a complete picture of how the facilities are 






2.2.1 Access Control 
At first Physical Access Control is discussed; any facility that deals with energy 
and due to safety reasons is always protected. Typically, Facilities will have a wall 
surrounding it or a means to limit access and control incoming and outgoing personal. At 
the entrance, people are provided access after being searched and their work 
Identification Card is checked. Depending on the criticality of the facility, a secondary 
biometric measure might be in place. It is important to note that within those facilities 
there are command centers and other locations that implements further security measures 
that is not available to all employees and requires a certain level of clearance.  
After gaining access to the locations that include the systems monitoring and 
controlling the facilities and the production of the oil logical access control measures will 
be in place, an engineer will typically be given a station that includes a password 
protected system that requires login using previously assigned accounts. Some of those 
systems are specialized to provide different access levels based on employee’s job 
classification or clearance level. For example, an operator will be able to see different 
reading of pressure and oil flow rate from a specific well, but only an engineer can 
modify settings to increase or decrease the flow rate by adjusting the well head opening 
or turbine rotation speed.  
Unfortunately, even with this detailed access control measures some ICS vendors 
and SCADA vendors will also dictate shared user accounts that are used by multiple 
personals. For example, a single user name and password for all operators, or a generic 
password that is used to share data across multiple systems via a centralized database that 






different devices that are attached to it and the access control security measures that it 
carries.  
2.2.2 Network Design 
So before getting into the security details of the network design, the author will 
discuss the flow of information, what is the point of origin? Destination? As well, as the 
users? 
At the start, an oil facility objective is to be able to produce oil by extracting it 
from the geographical topology in the area, refine it from any contamination and stabilize 
it for transportation in order to sell it. Those three functions can be done in a single 
facility or several facilities that each carries a single functionality before transferring the 
oil to the next one (ABB, 2013).  
Once an oil reservoir is found a study is made to decide the best locations to drill 
wells to maximize production and limit pockets of oil that cannot be extracted. Once the 
order is in place an oil well is drilled and several sensors are installed in the well head to 
monitor several oil attributes such as temperature, pressure, and flow rate. When refining 
the oil other devices are installed that monitors other attributes such as the density, 
composition (Cetinceviz & Bayindir, 2012). These sensors produce the raw data that is 
usually stored locally at a Remote Terminal Unit (RTU). The RTU stores data for a 
defined time while formatting it and preparing it for transportation over a network to the 
local command center. Communication could be done via radio, GSM, WI-FI, or fiber 
optic cables. Similar to a tree structure where the oil fields represents the tree leaves data 
is usually aggregated over several networking nodes before it reaches the trunk or in our 






After that data is being created from the sensors in the field and information is 
being transported via the network from the RTUs to the local database, SCADA systems 
and ICS applications utilizes that data to graphically represent the information for 
operators and engineers on site. Operators monitor those values to ensure operational 
wells are producing the required amount of oil, set forth by engineers, decided by 
management, and dictated by market demand. Operators also monitor well activities for 
any anomaly or safety concern due to the high pressure high temperature values of the oil 
being extracted (Cetinceviz & Bayindir, 2012).  
Typically, information gathered in the database from the oil field sensors is also 
accessed by research and development for further refinement and future studies or 
expansion to the reservoir. If the company has operations in different reservoirs or 
different facilities on the same one, data might be aggregated to a higher and bigger 
centralized data base from the local facilities. Data is owned and used by the facilities it’s 
produced from. Nevertheless, other employees that might not be within that facility itself 








Figure 2-1 Typical Smart Wellhead Design 
 
 
  The above diagram is developed based on many oil facilities that was visited and 







graph above, Security Access Control measures are usually implemented in the RTU 
around every oil well head to protect the data source. However, since those locations are 
usually scattered across a large areas and sometimes in very remote locations, physical 
security is sometime a huge challenge. RTUs are usually installed in cabinets that require 
special keys to open and the RTU consul itself is password protected.  
Every device on the network such as routers that are used to aggregate several 
RTU traffic into a single network is also password protected within a cabinet. This is in 
case it was being transported via fiber optic or different radio relay stations. If it was via 
GSM network then communication is directed directly to the local database via the 
telecommunication network of the GSM Company.  
The next step is the local database that is also password protected and physically 
secure in a limited access room hosting several critical servers and devices. In some cases 
this could be the last and final location where data is being stored and in others it could 
be simply another aggregation point before its being sent to a bigger centralized 
Database.  
2.3 Threat Intelligence Frameworks 
For an enterprise, threat intelligence is “an ecosystem of contextually relevant and 
evidence-based knowledge – integrated into platforms and tools – to quickly and 
accurately address dangers to individuals, organizations, or assets in a standardized, 







Figure 2-2 Five Stages of Threat Intelligence 
 
 
In general, the lifecycle of a given threat Intelligence framework goes over the 
above five stages shown in Figure 2-2. The planning stage is where goals are set and 
decisions are made as of what is should be protected. In the resource stage, resources are 
allocated to support the goal set in the first stage. Processing is the stage in which data is 
being acquired and information is gathered to achieve the goal set in the planning stage 
and within the limitation of the resources allocated. The Analyzing stage is where 
everything gathered is studied and analyzed to get results that help achieve our planned 
target. Finally Dissemination stage is where the results of all the previous stages have 
been achieve and is being implemented or distributed to induce action and change 
towards the goal set in the very beginning (Rocha, 2015). 
To compare the frameworks selected out of these five stages the following three is 
discussed: Processing, Analyzing, and Dissemination. Each of which can be broken into 












other. Information provided from intelligence sources is analyzed to identify threats and 
means of protection that is then implemented as a response in order to mitigate and 
address those issues. The following sections will discuss those categories. 
 
2.3.1 Planning 
In an energy sector or an enterprise that is striving to supply power to its 
customers the main driver for threat intelligence process is to secure and maintain assets 
and operational continuity (Farnham, 2013). However, in Saudi Aramco the company 
accounts for 80% of the national income GDP therefore the security of the enterprise is 
also driven by national security and the country’s economic stability or existence (CIA, 
2014). 
2.3.2 Intelligence Sources 
In general, enterprises in the energy sector are relatively similar in their sources of 
information. That includes internal sources, community, and external sources that are 
identified in the definitions section (Farnham, 2013). However, those sources are also 
broken into two more general categories, open source and private. Open source 
information is what is available and accessible free while private sources are ones that are 
not, which may include but not limited to, internally developed sources or feeds 
purchased from other third party security companies.  
2.3.3 Requirements of Threat Intelligence 
In order to automate and collaborate efforts with such systems a standardized 
format needs to be available to share indications of compromise and other related security 






Tools have to be selected to cover all related aspects of security that is of concern to the 
enterprise.  
2.3.4 Analyzing Cyber Threat Intelligence Input 
In every system, input gathered will greatly affect the quality of the system 
results. KPGM International has defined it as “Is the ability to analyze cyber intelligence 
gathered and to make links between discrete pieces of information to create actionable 
intelligence” (KPMG International, 2013, p. 4). This can be achieved using automated 
tools and trained operatives and personal. 
2.3.5 Response to Cyber Threat Intelligence 
From data that has been analyze actions are driven to mitigate security issues. 
This phase is continually being evaluated in order to keep up with the development or 
changes in the field. Nonetheless, respond is also affected by the kind of adversary or 
attacker. Attackers can be classified into the categories found in the definition section, 
Insider Threat, APT, Nation State Actors, Script Kiddie, and Hacktivist. (Ponemon 
Institute LLC, 2014). With all those types of adversaries in mind tactics of defending and 
the paths selected to respond is usually one of the following three mentioned below 
(Miller & Lachow, 2008). 
First is prevention and protection, it differs from organization to another based on 
the level of sophistication and spending based on the expected area of effect and damage 
influenced. Second is, Resilience, this could be a choice of action when the adversary is 
Nation State or highly sophisticated APT. Third is Deterrence, which could be used when 
dealing with APT and all types of adversaries other than nation state. Companies might 






or due to issues of legalities. For Saudi Aramco, this option is one that is available to be 
used. 
2.4 Frameworks Selected 
Upon reviewing ten threat intelligence framework the following, three covered 
the complete process of threat intelligence in a given organization without being too 
specific that it cannot be tailored to any given need or requirement by that specific 
organization. The frameworks are;  
 National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), Cybersecurity Framework  
 Open Source Threat Intelligence Framework (OSTI) 
 Collective Intelligence Framework (CIF) 
2.4.1 NIST Cybersecurity Framework 
The framework developed by NIST under the Executive Order 13636 given by 
Barack Obama the current president to address the continues rising security threats to the 
nations critical infrastructure. (Sedgewick, 2014). This framework is a  voluntary 
framework that helps reduce cyber risk to critical infrastructures. Since the Oil industry is 
part of the energy infrastructure it is applicable and suitable to be used for the purpose of 
this study. It’s also good to note that this framework is being continuously evaluated and 
updated as need by NIST. 
2.5 OSTI Framework 
The framework is being taught by SANS institute. It utilizes open source 






developed in 2013 and is continually being updated by the institution (Maxwell, 2013). A 
great example of how open source can assist and support in securing ICS and SCADA 
system is a study made that tried to bridge the gap. In which he tries to shorten the gap 
between the security professionals and the SCADA and ICS ones. A detailed simulation 
and examples where provided that shows how open sources could be a viable and 
affordable solution. (Nguyen, 2014) 
2.6 Collective Intelligence Framework 
The framework is based on an open source software on Google Code Hosting 
services developed by the community of users. Currently it is being run and administrated 
by a non-profit organization called CSIRT Gadgets Foundation. The code is also 
available in GitHub for all developers and community users (CSIRTGadgets, 2015). 
2.7 Summary 
In general, ICS and SCADA systems have been tasked to handle real-time life-
threatening systems in order to manage critical infrastructures by governments and 
private sectors. Security measures such as access control is lagging behind in the 
development of those infrastructures. Threats introduced by the convergence of network 
and internet connectivity have already caused damage and casualties in several incidents 
in the past decade. Researchers have identified those gaps. However these gaps are still 
affected by the continuous development of technologies, in relation to the product life 
cycle of the ICS and SCADA system (Igure, Laughter, & Williams, 2006). With those 






In this thesis an effort was made to focus on threat intelligence frameworks that 
can be implemented to continually secure access control means in different OS 
environments in the energy section. Scholars and researchers have been identifying 
different measures that help protect infrastructures using access control methods such as 
passwords, tokens and biometric features. However, such actions with intelligence 
information gathered would help capitalize on budgets being spent in the right manner to 
achieve security. In fact, examples in the following case studies have been published to 
discuss the added security in enhancing such measures.  
The importance of security is well acknowledged by entities related to the energy 
industry. Therefore, this study will provide some information and insight that will help 
prevent and secure assets and lives by its implementation. The mislead idea that cyber 
attacks, malware and viruses cannot cause causalities is wrong. Affecting ICS and 
SCADA systems remotely could cause undesirable reaction that could lead to explosions 
or exposure to harmful gasses and material. Maintaining security and access control 
measures by assessing and evaluating assets and procedures to eliminate unlawful action 
or negligent decisions is a goal in farther securing facilities in the Energy industry (Wiles, 








CHAPTER 3. PROCEDURES AND DATA COLLECTION 
3.1 Methodology 
Information used in this research was initially suppose to be acquired from reports 
and studies related to security and the oil and energy industry. However, due to the 
security nature of such information it was unobtainable. Therefore, a point system was 
developed that help rank different frameworks, based on the researcher experience in the 
field as shown in this Chapter. 
3.2 Data Collection 
As a result to the sensitivity of the data being studied, data was to be collected 
from public available reports related to the SCADA and ICS systems published or 
released by companies or associates in the energy industry dealing with access control 
security measure. Such companies are, Saudi ARAMCO, SABIC, Qatar Gas, Yokogawa. 
3.3 Data Analysis 
Data collected initially was supposed to be from open sources available and 
subsequent to fully acquiring enough data, in order to find, similar patterns in the results 
after analyzing the information. However, due to the nature of this data, being classified 







company accepted to share security realted data that helps the research. Therefore, a point 
system was created. 
3.4 Criteria 
After cross-analyzing ten of currently acceptable and used framework in the 
industry, several criteria’s have been identified to be relevant to companies in the oil 
industry or energy section in general. The following were the points used in this study to 
evaluate different threat intelligence frameworks being applied to an oil company. 
Followed by a simple table to score each of those criteria: 
 Applicable: Can be implemented in Oil Company covering all assets ranging from 
remote areas to business headquarters. 
Expandable Horizontally: The ability to expand and include more assets/lactation as 
needed. 
 Expandable Vertically: The ability to add more hierarchical layers to the 
Framework based on security requirements 
 Ease of implementation: Implementation is understandable and easy to use by all 
stake holders 
 Expenses: Ranges from Free to very expensive in comparison to each other, 
covering all implementation needed such as software/hardware/ procedures/ training.  
 Flexible: Accepts variation of implementation based on several criteria such as 
location, asset type, and security level 
 Covers all sources of Data: does it cover all sources of data available? Or some 






 Provide measurable Results: Provide a meaningful number as an evaluation for an 
asset or a security risk 
 Provide Comparative Ranking: Ability to prioritize risks and vulnerabilities 
 Recurring costs: how frequently does the framework require additional spending 
to operate? Note this does not cover any security implementation or decisions derived 
from the framework. 
In the following table, criteria are either; binary, or points from 0-4. In some of 
the criteria mentioned, the answer is either a yes or a no therefore maximum or minimum 
point score was assigned to reflect that. As for the other criteria, the scale from 0-4 was 
based on how much of the framework could be implanted, or how long it takes to be 
implemented. Those values help rank the framework based on all the criteria selected.  
Table 3-1 Criteria Table 
Criteria 0 1 2 3 4 
Applicable No 25% 50% 75% 100% 
Expandable Horizontally No - - - Yes 
Expandable Vertically No - - - Yes 
Ease of implementation 5 Year 3 Years 2 Years 1 Years > 1 Year 
Expenses 1M 500K 250K 100K Free 
Flexible No    Yes 
Covers all sources of data No 25% 50% 75% Yes 
Provide Measurable Results No - -  Yes 
Provide Comparative Ranking No - - - Yes 







This research provides a unique conclusion that can be generalized in similar 
settings and environments. However, with time passing by some of the findings might be 
irrelevant due to fast nature of advancement in technology and hence security related 
issues. Furthermore, the result achieved can be provided to several companies to assess 
and confirm the findings. Research is reliable and results could be carried out in 
companies working in the oil industry to test and ensure the efficiency of security 








CHAPTER 4. FINDINGS 
As described in previous chapters, the objective of this study was to determine the 
availability and ability of currently established and well-known threat intelligence 
framework to rank security measures upgrades in the oil field industry.  
4.1 NIST Cybersecurity Framework 
The following table on the next page shows the scores given to each criteria 















Ease of implementation 
Somewhat Difficult (1) 
Expenses 
Very Expensive (0) 
Flexible 
Yes (4) 
Covers all sources of data 
Yes (4) 
Provide Measurable Results 
Yes (4) 
Provide Comparative Ranking 
Yes (4) 
Recurring costs 




NIST, a framework developed by the US Federal Government scored the highest 
in the comparison as proven by the upcoming results. The NIST Framework has been 
generalized to the point that it can accommodate anything. However, that comes with a 
price. In order to accommodate a company specific needs a lot of customization and in 
house work will need to be done which makes it the most expensive framework with 
difficulty in implementation and a huge toll on continue maintenance. Yet, the fruits of 
this effort will be evident in providing the most related trusted actionable intelligence that 






4.2 OSTI Framework 
The following table shows the scores given to each criteria previously discussed 
in the mythology chapter for OSTI. 
Table 4-2 OSIT Framework 
Criteria Score 
Applicable  Yes (4) 
Expandable Horizontally Yes (4) 
Expandable Vertically Yes (4) 
Ease of implementation Normal (2) 
Expenses Free (4) 
Flexible Yes (4) 
Covers all sources of data No (0) 
Provide Measurable Results No (0) 
Provide Comparative Ranking No (0) 
Recurring costs No (4) 
Total Points 26 
 
The Open Source Threat Intelligence Framework is free, with no recurring cost. 
However, since data, sources are untrusted or vetted external sources it cannot be 
actionable and trusted as NIST Framework. It is also important to note that it does not 






4.3 Collective Intelligence Framework 
The following table shows the scores given to each criteria previously discussed 
in the mythology chapter for CIF.  
Table 4-3 CIF 
Criteria Score 
Applicable  Yes (4) 
Expandable Horizontally No (0) 
Expandable Vertically Yes (4) 
Ease of implementation Somewhat Difficult (1) 
Expenses Free (4) 
Flexible Yes (4) 
Covers all sources of data No (0) 
Provide Measurable Results Yes (4) 
Provide Comparative Ranking No (0) 
Recurring costs No (4) 
Total Points 25 
 
Collective Intelligence Framework (CIF) is an open source software based 
framework that aggregates data sources, unify information display and provide actionable 
measures and results. Unfortunately, since its open source it is community driven and 
sources that available for utilization are limited to extensions that provides appropriate 






which makes comparative ranking of outputs difficult to nonexistent (CSIRTGadgets, 
2015). 
4.4 Comparison 
Table 4-4  Frameworks Comparison 
Criteria NIST OSTIF CIT 
Applicable  Yes (4) Yes (4) Yes (4) 
Expandable Horizontally Yes (4) Yes (4) No (0) 
Expandable Vertically Yes (4) Yes (4) Yes (4) 
Ease of implementation 
Somewhat Difficult 
(1) Normal (2) 
Somewhat 
Difficult (1) 
Expenses Very Expensive (0) Free (4) Free (4) 
Flexible Yes (4) Yes (4) Yes (4) 
Covers all sources of data Yes (4) No (0) No (0) 
Provide Measurable Results Yes (4) No (0) Yes (4) 
Provide Comparative Ranking Yes (4) No (0) No (0) 
Recurring costs Every 6 Months (0) No (4) No (4) 
Total Points 29 26 25 
 
 
From the Table above it is evident that NIST scored better than the other 
frameworks due to its general nature. However, OSTI is also a viable solution since it is 






about CIF. Nonetheless, since both OSTI and CIF use mainly publicly available sources 
of intelligence it could hypothetically provide inaccurate risk information that might 
drive a different priority ranking for potential security upgrades. Having said that, vetting 
and vigorously analyzing all that public information is time consuming but could provide 
some information that can be translated into actionable intelligence.  
On the other hand, NIST covers all public and private information, which is 
customizable to the specific organization threat factors and actors. Which in the end 







CHAPTER 5. DISCUSSION 
In the previous chapters, the possibility of utilizing any threat intelligence 
framework in prioritizing security upgrades in Access Control Systems in the oil industry 
was discussed. The author covered different aspects and systems involved, what criteria 
is important in defining what type of framework would be applicable, Finally, the author 
used the mythology and scored the three different frameworks as shown in the results 
chapter. In this chapter, a more detailed approach will explain our results while striving to 
answer the research question. 
In this chapter, results from the criteria developed were discussed while tying it 
with the research question. This will help explain the relevant, as well as the score value 
representation to our thesis problem.  
Flexibility, Intel gathering is difficult and unique to any organization due to their 
setup, type of equipment used, and network layout. It could also be different within 
facilities in the same organization. In Fact, it could be argued that it is also different 
within the diverse systems in the same facility. Which brings up the importance of having 
a general framework that is flexible to accommodate change and diversity of the 
organizational structure or operational design. In our results, it is apparent that all 






Expandability, is another criteria that is important since those facilities are 
continually changing in order to keep up with the increase in demand or reduction in 
production. The ability to expand horizontally by adding new nodes to the current layer is 
very important since the drilling of oil wills is a frequent operation that is carried out to 
increase production or replace maintain current flow rate. Expanding vertically, is more 
hierarchical in nature and is needed to generalize information to different levels of 
stockholders such as local supervisors, general supervisors, managers, etc. This is a great 
feature to have but not a necessity like the ability to expand horizontally. 
Furthermore, the rest of the criteria are variables that simply helps differentiate 
between the frameworks. For example, how expensive is it to implement and if it has any 
reoccurring costs is something that might be important to some users more than others 
might. Ease of implementation might be another factor to be taken into consideration 
based on the organizational size. The last three criteria that might be of most concern are, 
verity of sources being used, ability to provide measurable results or comparative 
ranking. Those three criteria are what the author discussed in the following sections of 
this chapter in more details. 
5.1.1 Frameworks Data Inputs 
Information gathered as mentioned previously is very important in defining the 
quality and reliability of your out coming output. Being able to cover all sources of data 
is very important. However, not all frameworks selected in this study was able to 
incorporate all data sources. NIST cybersecurity framework is flexible and generalized in 
such a way that it can accommodate any source of input wither its publicly available, in-






the open source data, which is available freely by other organizations. CIF, is also limited 
and its limitation has nothing to do with cost. CIF limitation is based on add-ons and 
plugins that are developed by the community to accept and normalize feeds to be used by 
the system. Therefore, a source can only be used if it has an appropriate extension that is 
added to the main program to interpret and utilize its feed. Therefore, NIST seems to be 
the only Framework that can accommodate any type of source.  
5.1.2 Frameworks Ability to Measure results 
The ability to quantify the values of inputs and threats provided is very helpful in 
providing a general understanding of ranking among data. Thus, again our three 
frameworks are very different in these criteria. NIST once more since it is flexible and 
designed by the user specification is able to provide such information that is set forth by 
the user. CIF, is also able to provide that as part of the software package. However, the 
OSTI framework does not provide such information. Being able to assign numbers to 
threat actors or vulnerabilities discovered is helpful in future analysis leading to potential 
ranking among those inputs.  
5.1.3 Frameworks Ability to Rank Results 
NIST, yet again seems to be able to accommodate this criteria since it is 
customized and designed by the user. That could not be said to the other two frameworks 
since information provided and sources of data are not comprehensive in nature or do not 
provide measurable data. This makes NIST cybersecurity framework the most suitable 







Out of all Frameworks selected, NIST has shown the ability to be adoptable, 
flexible and reliable. However, that comes with a huge price tag and an ongoing cost on 
the organization. The reason NIST framework is able to accommodate any criteria being 
set is the inherited nature of it being generalized to accommodate any industry or 
organization that strives to implement it. The continues in-house customization of the 
framework will yield the best results imaginable for any organization as long as its 
carried out appropriately. 
Nonetheless, Open Source Threat Intelligence or Collective Intelligence 
Framework, should not be completely excluded because for a small organization with 
limited resources either of them could be a solution that increases security measures in a 
better way than simply going in blind. In Fact, even with available financial resources, 
the size of the company or the manpower available might not justify the huge cost 
encored from implementing a NIST framework (Holland, 2013).  
Finally, the answer is not believed to be either or. A hybrid solution could be best 
as well as less expensive than simply using a NIST cyber security framework. NIST 
framework provides all the guidelines necessary to be implemented for a threat 
intelligence framework to be used in an organization. Data and information is being 
developed and analyzed in-house driving decisions and upgrades needed (Shackleford, 
2015). However, it does not exclusively throw out the possibility of utilizing Open source 
intelligence feeds. In fact, it is possible to use the open source threat intelligence 
framework to help focus the data being analyzed and developed within the organization 






Framework could be used as a platform to help streamline all sources that include open 
one and the ones that are developed in house or even ones that are acquired by third 
parties. The financial cost of developing a complete threat intelligence framework 
platform for NIST drops down to a set of extensions that are uniquely used by the 
organization facilitating the use of the CIF. 
Finally, going back to the research question, is it possible to prioritize Access 
control Security upgrades within an organization in the oil industry utilizing a threat 
intelligence framework ? The answer is yes, it can be done using the NIST framework 
separately or in conjunction with other frameworks.  
Nevertheless, this research was also able to identify a ranking system that can be 
utilized to score and evaluate any security framework and its applicability to a specific 
company within the energy section industry. Those criteria can be given a different scale 
based on the company’s unique needs. Results will be reliable and a definite answer will 
emerge upon successfully applying it similar to the research in hand. 
5.3 Future Research 
Now that the answer was found using the frameworks available, a question arises 
if those frameworks are optimum specifically for the oil and gas industry. Is it possible to 
develop a new framework that is more efficient and suitable for the industry? Can a 
framework be developed that is less expensive? Or with minimum ongoing cost ? How 
difference is this to an electrical or energy specific Organization? Could this be 
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